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BOOK REVIEWS 293 
but they did have the concept of the natural powers of things. So an event which 
we might describe as transgressing a law of nature they might describe as 
exceeding the natural powers of the creatures involved. 
9. In his fullest example of how a reported miracle might be assessed (on p. 
161), he makes use of a pattern of supposed miracles. (The example is contained 
in the offset material above in the text.) 
10. In his example on p. 161, Houston speaks of "well-attested reports" and 
"reports of some weight." Moreover, part of his reason for discounting miracle 
reports in other religions is the poor quality of their attestation (204-205). 
11. Of course, if God continued to perform highly public miracles today to 
confirm revelation, the quality of the documentation of biblical miracles would 
not matter. But God does not do this either. To be sure, some people do claim 
that God is performing miracles today, but most people never experience any-
thing which seems to be a candidate for being a miracle; moreover, those who 
claim to experience miracles usually are already believers, so they have far less 
need for the confirmation than does the neutral, open inquirer to whom Houston 
proposes his methodology. 
12. The tension between attributing a revelation-confim1ing purpose to mira-
cles, on the one hand, and the pattern of occurrence of purported miracles and 
the quality of their documentation, on the other, is explored in my article" A 
Moral Argument against Miracles," Faith and Philosophy, 12 (January 1995). 
The Greater Good Defense: An Essay on the Rationality of Faith, by Melville 
Y. Stewart. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Pp. xi and 202. $55.00. 
JANE MARY TRAU, Allegany Health System, Tampa 
Stewarts' text should become a standard on reading lists for students of 
philosophical theology. As a classroom text, it offers an accessible intro-
duction to the dominant trends in contemporary Christian apologetics. 
This is not meant to imply that Stewart's treatment is any way superfi-
cial, but that he elucidates in a straightforward manner such complexi-
ties as Plantinga's "trans world depravity" and Molina's "middle knowl-
edge." As a precursor to primary sources, this text lays out with preci-
sion and clarity the basic conceptual problems and lines of defence to be 
studied in greater depth. 
Stewart's thesis is that much of Christian theodicv can be subsumed 
under a general category of defence, viz. the gre"'ater good defence 
(GGD). He then focuses on several specifications of that defence: the 
free-will specification; the growth to moral maturity / soul-growth 
defence specification; and the redemption specification (related to the 0 
Felix Culpa approach). In consideration of each of these specifications 
Stewart presents a concise review of the works of Keith Yandell, Alvin 
Plantinga, John Hick, and refers to Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas. 
He offers a knowledgeable account of the important critiques each of the 
three contemporary thinkers have attracted, and provides some able res-
cue attempts for each account. Stewart, however, does not attempt to 
provide a theodicy himself. In the end he offers his own specification of 
the GGD, the R-specification ( R = redemption), as a prop for the claim 
that belief in God is rational despite the existence of evil. Rational justifi-
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cation of belief is Stewart's goal. 
Stewart begins the work with a thorough statement of the problem the 
existence of evil presents for those who believe in the God of Christian 
theism. He then presents an analysis of the claim that God does not exist, 
or the claim that God probably does not exist. Though Stewart does not 
stress the distinction, he focuses on the argument from evil against God's 
existence, rather than the problem of evil, which is perceived by some 
theodicists to be a pastoral rather than a philosophical issue. 
Stewart's first chapters begin, as do many theodicies in the Christian 
tradition, with a discussion of the divine attributes, viz. omnipotence, 
omniscience, and omnibenevolence. The question considered is whether 
the existence of evil implies that the God of Christian theism simply 
does not exist, or that any god who may exist could not possibly fit that 
description? 
The familiar issue raised by this question pertains to whether any lim-
itations upon the actions taken by God would imply that God is limited. 
For instance, if God cannot do something that is logically impossible, or 
which is logically inconsistent with a compossible set of events, does 
that reality impugn the omnipotence of God? Stewart concludes, after 
citing the responses of Aquinas, Abelard, and Plantinga, that it does not. 
"These understandings of the divine predicates in question lomnipo-
tence, omniscience, and omnibenevolenceL are not viewed as logically 
incompatible, so they can belong to one and the same being ... We will 
assume that there is a coherent sense that can be given to each and that 
the attributes are logically compossible. Whatever problems remain are 
judged to be minor, needing only minor revisions at most." (54-55). 
Though this may sound like Stewart accepts the divine predicates tra-
ditionally associated with Christian theism, it also appears that he does 
allow some weakening with respect to omniscience (Chapter Two), if 
one includes divine foreknowledge as an integral part of omniscience. 
Stewart provides a simple (though not simplistic) explanation of the 
relation between truth and counterfactuals, and how knowledge of 
counterfactuals depends upon when those counterfactuals become actu-
al. If it is reasonable to say that neither God or anyone else can know 
that p is true, until it is true, then God's foreknowledge of p's truth may 
be impossible. Stewart accepts that such an impossibility does not limit 
God's omniscience. Though stalwarts may insist that omniscience 
include God's knowledge that p will be true rather than not p, Stewart's 
argument seems to prevail because his account of counterfactual 'knowl-
edge' is conjoined with his account of the freedom of moral agents. The 
longstanding objection that God's foreknowledge that p, rather than not 
p, would impinge upon some agent A's freedom to do p rather than not 
p, seems to be the real thrust of the argument, rather than the counter-
factual strategy. The question is not whether God or anyone else could 
know that p before p, but whether knowledge of p before p would obvi-
ate A's freedom to do p. 
Stewart's chapter (3) on the greater good defence (GGD), presents the 
GGD as derivative of the Ends Justifies the Means principle (EJM). He 
then reviews the standard discussions on deontological versus teleologi-
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cal justifications for the existence of evil. I was disappointed that Stewart 
stopped short of the conclusion I reached (Trau, The New Scholasticism, 
1986) about gratuitous evil. He does go so far as to say, 
... the critic of theism cannot know that E1 [any evil] lacks the 
properties (P)[Being morally allowed by God, if God exists] and 
(P**) [Being morally allowable by God] without also knowing 
that God does not exist, just as it is the case that a theist cannot 
know that E1 has the property (P*) [Being morally allowed by 
God] without knowing that God does exist. (77) 
I have put the case as follows: 
One cannot move from the claim the 
p: This instance of evil E has no apparent purpose (which is an episte-
mological claim, to the claim 
p2: This instance of evil E in fact has no purpose (which is an ontolog-
ical claim), 
For it might be the case that 
p3: There is some non-apparent purpose to E 
I claim that the theist, at least some theists, believes p3 because she 
believes that God does exist and may have some purpose for p3 known 
only to God. Faith in God precedes the willingness to grant the hidden 
purpose to E. The non theist assumes that p3 could not be true because 
the most reasonable context in which p3 could be true, viz. that God 
exists and has some purpose for E, has already been rejected. Thus I 
conclude, though Stewart does not, that the most reasonable position 
with respect to gratuitous evil, for both the theist and the non-theist, is 
epistemological agnosticism; and the most reasonable approach for 
theodicists and apologists is to reduce the weight given to instances of 
apparently gratuitous evil in their deliberations. 
Stewart's chapter (4) on derivations of the greater good defence, con-
centrating on the work of Keith Yandell, is quite good. I do take excep-
tion to Stewart's analysis of Yandell's account only because Stewart fails 
to defend it against the presumption that an ultimately favorable bal-
ance of good over evil relies upon human persons occupying a privi-
leged or superior position within creation. It is possible to hold that the 
creation of moral beings necessitates freedom, which establishes the pos-
sibility of moral evil, without believing that the exercise of that freedom 
or the creation of beings who possess that freedom is the greatest good 
within that creation. One could simply say that a universe which 
includes morally free beings is on the whole preferable to a universe in 
which there are no moral agents (assuming that moral agency requires 
freedom); and that a universe which includes human beings as equals 
with other kinds of beings within a created environment fulfills that 
preference. 
Stewart's chapter on the free will specification of the GGO offers a 
splendid account of Plantinga's overall approach. This chapter would be 
ideal as an introduction to the corpus of Plantinga's work. The same com-
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ment applies to the chapter on the growth to moral maturity and soul 
growth, focusing on the works of Yandell and Hick respectively. One dis-
agreement I have with Stewart regarding his understanding of Hick carries 
more weight when Stewart attempts to develop his own R-specification. 
Stewart believes that redemption is the most promising aspect of 
Christian theism in light of the GGO; best satisfies the logical require-
ments of GGO. He argues that redemption is the most promising aspect 
of Christian theism in light of the GGD. Redemption requires a Fall; and 
that Hick's theodicy does not necessitate redemption. Thus Stewart 
rejects Hick's theodicy as a candidate for the R-specification of the GGD. 
If redemption is the greater good which justifies, in fact requires moral 
evil, then (Stewart claims) there must be a Fall. Stewart's claim rests on 
his understanding of redemption as 'restorative.' If there were no 
prelapsarian state from which human persons fell, then there would be 
no need for restoration, and redemption would be gratuitous. Stewart is 
willing to discard Hick's theodicy because it does not support Stewart's 
R-specification of the GGO. 
An alternative interpretation of redemption, viz. one which does not 
imply restoration, could be used to establish the R-specification as con-
sistent with Hick's theodicy. For instance, one could argue that the 
'immature' state and imperfect environment in which human persons 
are created is admittedly and essentially distinct from the likeness into 
which they are called. 'Redemption' is the transfiguration from the crea-
turely state, i.e. bios, into the spiritual state, i.e. zoe. This notion of 
redemption could satisfy the GGO, without introducing the Fall. Of 
course Stewart would have to allow that restoration is not analytically 
necessary to the concept of redemption. He is unwilling to grant that 
Hick's account of 'epistemic distance' could function the way that the 
Fall does in a specification of the GGO. 
Stewart's construction of the R-specification is an attempt to fortify 
the rational ground for belief in the God of the Christian tradition. He 
concludes that moral evil has positive instrumental value, and is neces-
sary for redemption. Redemption is the greater good which counterbal-
ances or overbalances actual moral evil. Though his attempt is well 
done, those who side with Hick will not easily grant Stewart the point 
about the Fall. Other readers may experience a degree of discomfort 
with Stewart's use of male pronouns when referring to God. On the 
whole, it is an excellent and valuable contribution to the current obses-
sion with making belief in God 'respectable.' Though it is not intended 
as a work of conversion or passion, Stewart's work conveys a conviction 
of belief which underlies his significant analytic enterprise. All students 
and specialists of the field should take note. 
